Las reiteradas menciones que, tanto en estudios doctrinales como en el derecho positivo, se realizan del principio de jerarquía normativa parecen presuponer que "existe" una ordenación jerárquica de las diferentes fuentes y normas del ordenamiento. Frente a esto, nuestro ordenamiento jurídico no establece de una manera clara la relación entre las diferentes formas de producción normativa (si es jerárquica o de otro tipo) ni, en el primer caso, qué fuente o norma es superior a cual otra. El objeto de las (...) páginas que siguen es determinar cuándo (fuera de aquellos casos en los que las normas jurídicas establecen dicha relación) puede decirse que hay una relación de jerarquía. Para ello analizaré separadamente los diferentes criterios que la doctrina ha empleado para inferir dicha relación, como son: 1) el criterio de la fundamentación de la validez, 2) el deber de acatamiento por parte de los órganos productores de la norma inferior, 3) el criterio general-individual, 4) el órgano, 5) la forma de las fuentes, 6) la complejidad procedimental, y 7) la capacidad modificadora y derogatoria. (shrink)

Una de las cuestiones a que se enfrenta la teoría de la argumentación jurídica, y a la que se dedica este trabajo, es poner de relieve el papel que las valoraciones tienen en el proceso de aplicación del derecho. Las razones valorativas juegan un papel más importante que el que la concepción positivista del derecho suele advertir. En muchos casos las decisiones judiciales no pueden justificarse en el propio derecho, sino en valoraciones ajenas al mismo. Esto no debe significar que, (...) en este ámbito, aquellas sean necesariamente arbitrarias, pero sí discrecionales, lo que conlleva que deben establecerse algunos criterios de racionalidad; criterios que no son ya jurídicos, sino de carácter moral o ético. (shrink)

It is shown that the before-before (or Suarez-Scarani) experiment refutes hidden variable models with a deterministic (“realistic”) nonlocal part, whereas experiments violating Leggett-type inequalities refute models with biased random local part. Therefore the claim that Gröblacher et al. (Nature 446:871–875, 2007) present “an experimental test of nonlocal realism” is misleading, and Marek Żukowski’s (Found. Phys. 38:1070, 2008) comment misses the point. A new experiment is suggested.

The aim of this paper is to account for the indeterminacy of legal texts brought about by the peculiarities of the language in which they are formulated. From the start, I asume that legal language is a special language, that is, it is an ordinary language with some specific semantical features. On this assumption, the semantical features of legal texts and the syntactycal ones are dealt with separately. In this account, however, I omit the pragmatical function of such language. Concerning (...) the semantical features that give rise to indeterminacy, I deal on the one hand, with the problems raised from legal terms in general, and the other hand, with the problems raised from terms expressing deontic relations at their deep structure. To conclude, an analysis of ambiguity derived from the syntactycal structure of legal sentences is proposed, on the basis of several exampIes. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to account for the indeterminacy of legal texts brought about by the peculiarities of the language in which they are formulated. From the start, I asume that legal language is a special language, that is, it is an ordinary language with some specific semantical features. On this assumption, the semantical features of legal texts and the syntactycal ones are dealt with separately. In this account, however, I omit the pragmatical function of such language. Concerning (...) the semantical features that give rise to indeterminacy, I deal on the one hand, with the problems raised from legal terms in general, and the other hand, with the problems raised from terms expressing deontic relations at their deep structure. To conclude, an analysis of ambiguity derived from the syntactycal structure of legal sentences is proposed, on the basis of several exampIes. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to ofter a general view of the development of the issue about judicial reasoning and argumentation in Europe. I start with a mention to the methodological problem in law, and after that I expose the main models about the so called “legal argumentation theories”. Thirdly, I bring out some general thesis about judicial reasoning, and finally I propose some critical reflections about those theories.

The aim of this paper is to account for the indeterminacy of legal texts brought about by the peculiarities of the language in which they are formulated. From the start, I asume that legal language is a special language, that is, it is an ordinary language with some specific semantical features. On this assumption, the semantical features of legal texts and the syntactycal ones are dealt with separately. In this account, however, I omit the pragmatical function of such language. Concerning (...) the semantical features that give rise to indeterminacy, I deal on the one hand, with the problems raised from legal terms in general, and the other hand, with the problems raised from terms expressing deontic relations at their deep structure. To conclude, an analysis of ambiguity derived from the syntactycal structure of legal sentences is proposed, on the basis of several exampIes. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to account for the indeterminacy of legal texts brought about by the peculiarities of the language in which they are formulated. From the start, I asume that legal language is a special language, that is, it is an ordinary language with some specific semantical features. On this assumption, the semantical features of legal texts and the syntactycal ones are dealt with separately. In this account, however, I omit the pragmatical function of such language. Concerning (...) the semantical features that give rise to indeterminacy, I deal on the one hand, with the problems raised from legal terms in general, and the other hand, with the problems raised from terms expressing deontic relations at their deep structure. To conclude, an analysis of ambiguity derived from the syntactycal structure of legal sentences is proposed, on the basis of several exampIes. (shrink)

I argue against theories that attempt to reduce scientific representation to similarity or isomorphism. These reductive theories aim to radically naturalize the notion of representation, since they treat scientist's purposes and intentions as non-essential to representation. I distinguish between the means and the constituents of representation, and I argue that similarity and isomorphism are common but not universal means of representation. I then present four other arguments to show that similarity and isomorphism are not the constituents of scientific representation. I (...) finish by looking at the prospects for weakened versions of these theories, and I argue that only those that abandon the aim to radically naturalize scientific representation are likely to be successful. (shrink)

A Richard Rorty se le considera hoy en día como uno de los filósofos más importantes de Norteamérica. Es posible que esta afirmación sea discutible; lo indiscutible es que, a juicio de los críticos, es el mejor escritor filosófico después de Bertrand Russell….

This paper argues for a representational semantic conception of scientific theories, which respects the bare claim of any semantic view, namely that theories can be characterised as sets of models. RSC must be sharply distinguished from structural versions that assume a further identity of ‘models’ and ‘structures’, which we reject. The practice-turn in the recent philosophical literature suggests instead that modelling must be understood in a deflationary spirit, in terms of the diverse representational practices in the sciences. These insights are (...) applied to some mathematical models, thus showing that the mathematical sciences are not in principle counterexamples to RSC. (shrink)

The Spanish Jesuit Francisco Suarez was an eminent philosopher and theologian whose _Disputationes Metaphysicae_ was first published in Spain in 1597 and was widely studied throughout Europe during the seventeenth century. The _Disputationes Metaphysicae_ had a great influence on the development of early modern philosophy and on such well-known figures as Descartes and Leibniz. This is the first time that Disputations 17, 18, and 19 have been translated into English. The _Metaphysical Disputations_ provide an excellent philosophical introduction to the medieval (...) Aristotelian discussion of efficient causality. The work constitutes a synthesis of monumental proportions: problematic issues are lucidly delineated and the various arguments are laid out in depth. Disputations 17, 18, and 19 deal explicitly with such issues as the nature of causality, the types of efficient causes, the prerequisites for causal action, causal contingency, human free choice, and chance. (shrink)

An English translation of the Second Disputation.

This paper expands on, and provides a qualified defence of, Arthur Fine's selective interactions solution to the measurement problem. Fine's approach must be understood against the background of the insolubility proof of the quantum measurement. I first defend the proof as an appropriate formal representation of the quantum measurement problem. The nature of selective interactions, and more generally selections, is then clarified, and three arguments in their favour are offered. First, selections provide the only known solution to the measurement problem (...) that does not relinquish any of the explicit premises of the insolubility proofs. Second, unlike some no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics, selections suffer no difficulties with non-ideal measurements. Third, unlike most collapse interpretations, selections can be independently motivated by an appeal to quantum propensities. IntroductionThe problem of quantum measurement2.1 The ignorance interpretation of mixtures2.2 The eigenstate–eigenvalue link2.3 The quantum theory of measurementThe insolubility proof of the quantum measurement3.1 Some notation3.2 The transfer of probability condition (TPC)3.3 The occurrence of outcomes condition (OOC)A defence of the insolubility proof4.1 Stein's critique4.2 Ignorance is not required4.3 The problem of quantum measurement is an idealisationSelections5.1 Representing dispositional properties5.2 Selections solve the measurement problem5.3 Selections and ignoranceNon-ideal selections6.1 No-collapse interpretations and non-ideal measurements6.2 Exact and approximate measurements6.3 Selections for non-ideal interactions6.4 Approximate selections6.5 Implications for ignoranceSelective interactions test quantum propensities7.1 Equivalence classes as physical ‘aspects’: a critique7.2 Quantum dispositions7.3 Selections as a propensity modal interpretation7.4 A comparison with Popper's propensity interpretation. (shrink)

Bourrat and Griffiths :33, 2018) have recently argued that most of the evidence presented by holobiont defenders to support the thesis that holobionts are evolutionary individuals is not to the point and is not even adequate to discriminate multispecies evolutionary individuals from other multispecies assemblages that would not be considered evolutionary individuals by most holobiont defenders. They further argue that an adequate criterion to distinguish the two categories is fitness alignment, presenting the notion of fitness boundedness as a criterion that (...) allows divorcing true multispecies evolutionary individuals from other multispecies assemblages and provides an adequate criterion to single out genuine evolutionary multispecies assemblages. A consequence of their criterion is that holobionts, as conventionally defined by hologenome defenders, are not evolutionary individuals except in very rare cases, and for very specific host-symbiont associations. This paper is a critical response to Bourrat and Griffiths’ arguments and a defence of the arguments presented by holobiont defenders. Drawing upon the case of the hologenomic basis of the evolution of sanguivory in vampire bats, I argue that Bourrat and Griffiths overlook some aspects of the biological nature of the microbiome that justifies the thesis that holobionts are evolutionarily different to other multispecies assemblages. I argue that the hologenome theory of evolution should not define the hologenome as a collection of genomes, but as the sum of the host genome plus some traits of the microbiome which together constitute an evolutionary individual, a conception I refer to as the stability of traits conception of the hologenome. Based on that conception I argue that the evidence presented by holobiont defenders is to the point, and supports the thesis that holobionts are evolutionary individuals. In this sense, the paper offers an account of the holobiont that aims to foster a dialogue between hologenome advocates and hologenome critics. (shrink)

L'index detaille de la Metaphysique d'Aristote publie en 1597 par Suarez, constitue une introduction aux Disputes metaphysiques. Il a pour objectif de produire les conditions d'un renouvellement de l'heritage de la Metaphysique d'Aristote en redefinissant le contenu et les limites d'une science de l'etant.Le projet de refondation de la metaphysique comme ontologie s'effectue dans cet ouvrage de presentation en quatre moments:1) L'exposition du probleme de la nature de la connaissance qui implique le depassement de l'equivocite de la notion de sagesse.2) (...) La determination de l'objet, des proprietes et des principes veritables de la metaphysique en tant que science de l'universel, c'est a dire de l'etantite de l'etant selon son abstraction la plus extreme.3) La redefinition du statut de la realite a partir d'une theorie de la representation de l'objet qui fasse abstraction de l'objet, c'est a dire qui procede a l'indifferenciation des etants afin d'en donner une representation universelle et abstraite; ainsi est affirme le primat d'une ontologie de l'essence sur toute ontotheologie.4) Enfin, la mise en place d'un systeme de reference transcendantal rendant possible une fondation universelle de la comprehension de l'etant par la mediation d'une theorie du concept.L'index prefigure ainsi, par son ambition et sa demarche, ce que Heidegger nommera, en evoquant la philosophie de Suarez, l'avenement du "caractere fondamental de la metaphysique moderne". (shrink)

Contemporary biological research has suggested that some host–microbiome multispecies systems (referred to as “holobionts”) can in certain circumstances evolve as unique biological individual, thus being a unit of selection in evolution. If this is so, then it is arguably the case that some biological adaptations have evolved at the level of the multispecies system, what we call hologenomic adaptations. However, no research has yet been devoted to investigating their nature, or how these adaptations can be distinguished from adaptations at the (...) species-level (genomic adaptations). In this paper, we cover this gap by investigating the nature of hologenomic adaptations. By drawing on the case of the evolution of sanguivory diet in vampire bats, we argue that a trait constitutes a hologenomic adaptation when its evolution can only be explained if the holobiont is considered the biological individual that manifests this adaptation, while the bacterial taxa that bear the trait are only opportunistic beneficiaries of it. We then use the philosophical notions of emergence and inter-identity to explain the nature of this form of individuality and argue why it is special of holobionts. Overall, our paper illustrates how the use of philosophical concepts can illuminate scientific discussions, in the trend of what has recently been called metaphysics of biology. (shrink)

Scientific representation is a currently booming topic, both in analytical philosophy and in history and philosophy of science. The analytical inquiry attempts to come to terms with the relation between theory and world; while historians and philosophers of science aim to develop an account of the practice of model building in the sciences. This article provides a review of recent work within both traditions, and ultimately argues for a practice-based account of the means employed by scientists to effectively achieve representation (...) in the modelling sciences. (shrink)

Symbiosis plays a fundamental role in contemporary biology, as well as in recent thinking in philosophy of biology. The discovery of the importance and universality of symbiotic associations has brought new light to old debates in the field, including issues about the concept of biological individuality. An important aspect of these debates has been the formulation of the hologenome concept of evolution, the notion that holobionts are units of natural selection in evolution. This review examines the philosophical assumptions that underlie (...) recent proposal of the hologenome concept of evolution, and traces those debates back in time to their historical origins, to the moment when the connection between the topics of symbiosis and biological individuality first caught the attention of biologists. The review is divided in two parts. The first part explores the historical origins of the connection between the notion of symbiosis and the concept of biological individuality, and emphasizes the role of A. de Bary, R. Pound, A. Schneider and C. Merezhkowsky in framing the debate. The second part examines the hologenome concept of evolution and explores four parallelisms between contemporary debates and the debates presented in the first part of the essay, arguing that the different debates raised by the hologenome concept were already present in the literature. I suggest that the novelty of the hologenome concept of evolution lies in the wider appreciation of the importance of symbiosis for maintaining life on Earth as we know it. Finally, I conclude by suggesting the importance of exploring the connections among contemporary biology, philosophy of biology and history of biology in order to gain a better understanding of contemporary biology. (shrink)

Holobionts are symbiotic assemblages composed by a host plus its microbiome. The status of holobionts as individuals has recently been a subject of continuous controversy, which has given rise to two main positions: on the one hand, holobiont advocates argue that holobionts are biological individuals; on the other, holobiont detractors argue that they are just mere chimeras or ecological communities, but not individuals. Both parties in the dispute develop their arguments from the framework of the philosophy of biology, in terms (...) of what it takes for a “conglomerate” to be considered an interesting individual from a biological point of view. However, the debates about holobiont individuality have important ontological implications that have remained vaguely explored from a metaphysical framework. The purpose of this paper is to cover that gap by presenting a metaphysical approach to holobionts individuality. Drawing upon a conception of natural selection that puts the focus on the transgenerational recurrence of the traits and that supports the thesis that holobionts are units of selection, we argue that holobionts bear emergent traits and exert downward powers over the entities that compose them. In this vein, we argue, a reasonable argument can be made for conceiving holobionts as emergent biological individuals. (shrink)

In this paper we claim that the notion of cognitive representation (and scientific representation in particular) is irreducibly plural. By means of an analogy with the minimalist conception of truth, we show thatthis pluralism is compatible with a generally deflationary attitude towards representation. We then explore the extent and nature of representational pluralism by discussing the positive and negative analogies between the inferential conception of representation advocated by one of us and the minimalist conception of truth.

This Element has two main aims. The first one is an historically informed review of the philosophy of probability. It describes recent historiography, lays out the distinction between subjective and objective notions, and concludes by applying the historical lessons to the main interpretations of probability. The second aim focuses entirely on objective probability, and advances a number of novel theses regarding its role in scientific practice. A distinction is drawn between traditional attempts to interpret chance, and a novel methodological study (...) of its application. A radical form of pluralism is then introduced, advocating a tripartite distinction between propensities, probabilities and frequencies. Finally, a distinction is drawn between two different applications of chance in statistical modelling which, it is argued, vindicates the overall methodological approach. The ensuing conception of objective probability in practice is the 'complex nexus of chance'. (shrink)

These are the introduction chapters to the forthcoming collection of essays published by Springer (Synthese Library) and entitled Probabilities, Causes and Propensities in Physics.

This paper is divided in two parts. In part I, I argue against two attempts to naturalise the notion of scientific representation, by reducing it to isomorphism and similarity. I distinguish between the means and the constituents of representation, and I argue that isomorphism and similarity are common means of representation; but that they are not constituents of scientific representation. I look at the prospects for weakened versions of these theories, and I argue that only those that abandon the aim (...) to naturalise scientific representation are likely to be successful. In part II of the paper, I present a deflationary conception of scientific representation, which minimally characterises it by means of two necessary conditions: representation is essentially intentional and it has the capacity to allow surrogate reasoning and inference. I then defend this conception by showing that it successfully meets the objections and difficulties that make its competitors, such as isomorphism and similarity, untenable. In addition the inferential conception explains the success of various means of representation in their appropriate domains, and it sheds light on the truth and accuracy of scientific representations. (shrink)

This paper argues that if propensities are displayed in objective physical chances then the appropriate representation of these chances is as indexed probability functions. Two alternative formal models, or accounts, for the relation between propensity properties and their chancy or probabilistic manifestations, in terms of conditionals and conditional probability are first reviewed. It is argued that both confront important objections, which are overcome by the account in terms of indexed probabilities. A number of further advantages of the indexed probability account (...) are discussed, which suggest that it is promising as a general theory of objective physical chance. The paper ends with a discussion of the indexical character of the objective chances that are grounded in propensities. (shrink)

Philippe Huneman has recently questioned the widespread application of mechanistic models of scientific explanation based on the existence of structural explanations, i.e. explanations that account for the phenomenon to be explained in virtue of the mathematical properties of the system where the phenomenon obtains, rather than in terms of the mechanisms that causally produce the phenomenon. Structural explanations are very diverse, including cases like explanations in terms of bowtie structures, in terms of the topological properties of the system, or in (...) terms of equilibrium. The role of mathematics in bowtie structured systems and in topologically constrained systems has recently been examined in different papers. However, the specific role that mathematical properties play in equilibrium explanations requires further examination, as different authors defend different interpretations, some of them closer to the new-mechanistic approach than to the structural model advocated by Huneman. In this paper, we cover this gap by investigating the explanatory role that mathematics play in Blaser and Kirschner’s nested equilibrium model of the stability of persistent long-term human-microbe associations. We argue that their model is explanatory because: i) it provides a mathematical structure in the form of a set of differential equations that together satisfy an ESS; ii) that the nested nature of the ESSs makes the explanation of host-microbe persistent associations robust to any perturbation; iii) that this is so because the properties of the ESS directly mirror the properties of the biological system in a non-causal way. The combination of these three theses make equilibrium explanations look more similar to structural explanations than to causal-mechanistic explanation. (shrink)

On a purely epistemic understanding of experimental realism, manipulation affords a particularly robust kind of causal warrant, which is – like any other warrant – defeasible. I defend a version of Nancy Cartwright’s inference to the most likely cause, and I conclude that this minimally epistemic version of experimental realism is a coherent, adequate and plausible epistemology for science.

1Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, 9 Woodland Road, Bristol BS8 1TB, UKScience Without Laws Ronald Giere Chicago, IL University of Chicago Press 1999 x + 285 Hardback£17.50.

It is still a matter of controversy whether the Principle of the Common Cause (PCC) can be used as a basis for sound causal inference. It is thus to be expected that its application to quantum mechanics should be a correspondingly controversial issue. Indeed the early 90’s saw a flurry of papers addressing just this issue in connection with the EPR correlations. Yet, that debate does not seem to have caught up with the most recent literature on causal inference generally, (...) which has moved on to consider the virtues of a generalised PCC-inspired condition, the so-called Causal Markov Condition (CMC). In this paper we argue that the CMC is an appropriate benchmark for debating possible causal explanations of the EPR correlations. But we go on to take issue with some pronouncements on EPR by defenders of the CMC. (shrink)